Security Council Reform: When and How It Can Be Done
Opinion by Sukehiro Hasegawa, Kerstin Leitner and Georgios Kostakos
January 14, 2025
The Security Council can be reformed, but how? The authors, a trio of ex-UN officials, suggest a two-step approach, focusing on five “key issues”: the size of an expanded body, membership categories, regional representation, veto-related questions, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. Here, some ambassadors gathered in the Council before it voted on admitting Palestine as a full member of the UN on April 18, 2024. The United States vetoed the draft resolution.
The start of 2025 finds the world in turmoil, conflict, and suffering, with the United Nations feeble and unable to have a positive impact beyond humanitarian relief. The world would stand a better chance of achieving sustainable peace and prosperity if the Security Council were functioning as foreseen in the UN Charter.
The world leaders adopted the Pact for the Future at the Summit of the Future on Sept. 22, 2024. They affirmed their commitment to reforming the Security Council to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic, and accountable (Action 39) and to strengthening its relationship with the General Assembly (Action 41), working in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) as a priority and without delay (Action 40).
To assist the relevant negotiations in achieving substantive results, we propose a two-step approach to Security Council reform, building on five key issues on which the IGN has focused. They are the size of an enlarged Security Council, membership categories, regional representation, veto-related questions, and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.
The first step would be a General Assembly decision in September 2025, when the UN celebrates its 80th anniversary, on the enlargement of the Security Council and the kind and distribution of the new Council seats. This process should culminate within a few years or by the 85th anniversary of the UN in 2030. The second step would be to convene a general conference based on Article 109 of the UN Charter and make a more comprehensive reform of the Council and the UN as a whole by the end of the UN centennial anniversary year, 2045, at the latest.
There have been suggestions for two new Security Council permanent seats going to African states to realize the Africans’ aspiration to be recognized as essential players in the UN. We understand this as a political and emotional rather than a rational call, similar to the longstanding insistence of Germany and Japan, along with Brazil and India (the “G4”), to become permanent Council members. This approach, though, would reinforce the oligopolistic nature of the Council. In an organization whose purpose is to maintain peace and security throughout the globe, the Council members should not only be representative of their own country and region. They should also be accountable to the entire UN membership and the people of the world, for whom peace is a public good and the basis for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and more.
As part of the first step that we suggest, Council enlargement models proposed by various groups should be put before the General Assembly as draft resolutions for voting. If none of the models are adopted, the IGN should set up a drafting group of member states to develop a model for adoption by the General Assembly. Such a model could foresee an increase of the Council membership by 10 five-year renewable seats; the distribution of the 10 new seats to the regions, which would also include the League of Arab States as a region; ways to ensure that regional distribution also allows the representation of key “functional” or “interest” groups of member states, like those of the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs); and criteria for the election of countries to the 10 new seats, such as their contributions to international peace and security as well as to other aspects of the UN’s work, and having the trust and confidence of at least two-thirds of the entire UN membership.
As the second step of our Council reform proposal, the five permanent seats could be converted to 10-year renewable term seats without any regional requirement and without the veto prerogative. The same criteria as above would apply for re-election, and a newly created Parliamentary Assembly representing the people of member states could advise the General Assembly on countries’ records. Regional organizations like the African Union, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Arab League could also be considered for these five seats.
After such a two-step reform, the UN could start its second century with a Council of 25 members, none of them permanent and none veto-wielding but instead elected: five for 10-year renewable terms, 10 for five-year renewable terms and 10 for two-year nonrenewable terms, with the last two categories subject to geographical distribution.
We appreciate the significant progress made by the IGN so far and call on them to rise above the Westphalian mentality and take the first step toward a more legitimate Security Council that is representative, effective, and accountable to all the people of the UN worldwide.
長谷川祐弘氏以下3名の元国連シニアスタッフの安保理改革提案へのコメント
神余隆博 関西学院大学学長特別顧問（元国連大使：次席常駐代表）
元国連シニアスタッフの3人による国連安保理改革提案は、国連創設80周年から85周年を第一段階、100周年までを第二段階とする2段階の改革案を示しています。
第一段階では、2030年までに安保理の新たな議席拡大ならびにその種類と地域等への配分を決定し、再選可能な5年任期の理事国を10カ国創設することが提案されています。この案は、安保理の特権的性格（oligopolistic nature ）のさらなる拡大を防ごうとするもので、多くの加盟国やその国民の期待に応える内容となっています。一方で、新議席の対象を地域組織（アラブ連盟: League of Arab States等）や小島嶼連盟（Association of Small Island States: AOISIS）などの利害関係組織にも拡大するという提案については、これらの組織の意思決定の迅速性や実効性に課題があり、現実的な運用に疑問が残ると思います。特に、意思決定が迅速に行われない場合、地域組織等が安保理での責任を十分に果たせないことが懸念されます。
第二段階では、５常任理事国を10年任期で再選可能な長期の理事国に転換するという大胆な提案が行われています。しかし、この改革案には現実的な障壁が多く、既存の常任理事国による強い反発や、国連憲章改正案批准時の拒否権行使が予想されます。特に、この長期の理事国の対象をＥＵ、ＡＵ、ＡＳＥＡＮなどの地域組織にも拡大することについては、第一段階と同様の問題があり、より深刻な影響を与える可能性が指摘されます。
この提案は、第二段階だけではなく、第一段階の改革も国連憲章の改正を必要とすることに言及していません。憲章の改正は加盟国の3分の2による賛成と憲章改正案の批准が必要で、この批准の段階で常任理事国は拒否権行使が可能です。第一段階の改革も常任理事国の拒否権で改革案が葬られてしまうリスクは常に存在しているため、常任理事国が賛成できる案を慎重に交渉しなければなりません。第二段階の改革が明らかに彼らにとって不利になることが予め明白な改革案は、第一段階の憲章改正案の決議採択と批准の際に潜んでいる潜在的な危険性です。そのような観点からは。第二段階での改革案に現時点では具体的に踏み込まず、常任理事国の構成、拒否権等に関して検討を行うことを簡単に触れるのみにとどめておいた方が交渉戦術の観点からは良いのではないかと考えられます。
他方で、提案には「Parliamentary Assembly」を設置し、長期の理事国のパフォーマンスを監視するという斬新なアイデアも含まれています。この仕組みは、現行の常任理事国に対しても適用し、その行動を評価・報告することで常任理事国の専横的行動を抑止する効果が期待されます。権限・構成・選出方法等議論を呼ぶ要素は多いものの、アイデアとしては興味深く、国連総会決議等での導入は検討に値するものと思われます。
一方で、提案全体には課題も多く、特に第二段階の改革案は、常任性と拒否権という特権を奪われる既存の常任理事国の強い反発を招くため、現実的な実現可能性は低いと考えられます。これにより、場合によっては常任理事国の一部およびそれに同調する国が国連を脱退するリスクすらあり、過去の国際連盟の衰退と同様の道をたどる可能性も指摘されます。
提案は安保理改革に関する興味深い要素を含む一方で、実現可能性を考えると現実主義（リアリズム）と交渉力学に基づいた漸進的な改革を目指す必要があります。今日の国際情勢は大国間の対立や分断、ポピュリズムやナショナリズムの台頭など、第二次世界大戦前と同様の不安定な要素が多く、安保理改革が国際秩序の不安定化や新たな紛争の引き金とならないよう慎重に進めるべきです。理想論ではなく現実主義に基づき、大国の国連脱退リスクを防ぎつつ、安保理改革を実現可能な形で進めることが求められています。
今回の提案は、世界政治の現実に即して実現可能な部分を採用し、実現困難なアイデアについては再検討を行う必要があります。3人の提案者の意図がそうでないことは勿論分かっていますが、改革の目的は国連を分断させるのではなく、現状を漸進的に改善し、より良い方向に向かわせることです。このため、国際情勢や地政学的な影響を慎重に考慮した実現可能かつ持続可能な改革案が求められます。
Comments on the UN Security Council Reform Proposal by Dr. Sukehiro Hasegawa and Two Other Former Senior UN Officials
By Dr. Takahiro Shinyo, Professor and Special Advisor to the President of Kwansei Gakuin University (Former Japanese Ambassador and DPR to the UN)
The UN Security Council reform proposal by three former senior UN officials outlines a two-stage reform plan, with the 80th to 85th anniversaries of the UN as the first stage and by the 100th anniversary as the second stage.
In the first stage, the proposal suggests that by 2030, the Security Council should decide on the expansion of its membership, including new categories and their distribution, and establish ten new member states serving as council members with a renewable five-year term. This proposal aims to prevent further expansion of the Council’s oligopolistic nature, addressing the expectations of many member states and their citizens.
However, the suggestion to extend new memberships to regional organizations such as the League of Arab States or common- interest- based organization such as the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) raises questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of their decision-making processes. Concerns remain about the operational viability of such memberships, especially if these organizations fail to make timely decisions, potentially hindering their ability to fulfill responsibilities in emergency cases within the Security Council.
The second stage includes a bold proposal to convert the five permanent members into long-term members with renewable ten-year terms. However, this reform presumably faces significant practical obstacles, including strong opposition from current permanent members and the anticipated use of veto powers during the UN Charter amendment process, particularly at the ratification timing. The idea of extending long-term membership to regional organizations such as the EU, AU, and ASEAN encounters similar issues as in the first stage, but with potentially greater impact and complexity.
This proposal also fails to mention that not only the second stage of reform but also the first stage requires amendments to the UN Charter. Amending the Charter requires the approval of two-thirds of the member states and ratification of the amendment proposal. At the ratification stage, the permanent members of the Security Council can exercise their veto power. There is always a risk that the reform proposal for the first stage could be nullified by a veto from a permanent member. Therefore, it is essential to carefully negotiate a proposal that the permanent members can agree on.
Proposals that are clearly disadvantageous to them in the second stage of reform pose a latent risk during the resolution and ratification process of the Charter amendment proposal in the first stage. From this perspective, it might be more prudent, from a negotiation strategy standpoint, not to delve too deeply into specific proposals for the second stage of reform. Instead, it would be better to limit the discussion to a brief mention of considering the composition of the permanent members, veto power, and other related issues.
Additionally, the proposal includes a novel idea to establish a “Parliamentary Assembly” to monitor the performance of long-term members. This mechanism would also apply to the current permanent members, evaluating and reporting their actions to deter unilateral behavior. While the concept is intriguing, debates are likely regarding its authority, composition, and selection methods. Nevertheless, the idea merits consideration through a UN General Assembly resolution.
On the other hand, the proposal presents serious challenges, particularly the second stage of reform. Depriving current permanent members of their privileges of permanency and veto power would likely provoke strong resistance, making its realization highly unlikely. This could even lead to the eventual withdrawal of some permanent members and their allies from the UN, raising the risk of the UN facing a decline similar to that of the League of Nations.
While the proposal contains compelling elements for Security Council reform, a pragmatic and gradual approach grounded in realism and the dynamics of diplomatic negotiation is essential. Given the current international environment, marked by great power rivalry, division, and the rise of populism and nationalism—reminiscent of the pre-World War II era—it is vital to avoid reforms that could destabilize the international order or trigger new conflicts. Reform efforts should focus on achievable measures that prevent the withdrawal of major powers while ensuring realistic progress.
This proposal requires careful selection of actionable ideas while reevaluating impractical ones. Although the intent of the three proponents is undoubtedly to improve the UN, the objective of reform should be to gradually enhance the current system rather than divide the organization. A sustainable and achievable reform plan, informed by geopolitical realities and international circumstances, is imperative.